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Securities Regulation-A New Loophole in Section 16(b)-An Insider's
Delight
Before 1934, corporate insiders were able to reap large profits by

speculating in their own corporation's securities because of their access
to inside information.' Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 was enacted to protect the interests of the public and other stock-

holders against such abuse.3 To accomplish this purpose, section 16(b)
imposes strict liability for profits realized by any insider from a purchase and sale or sale and purchase accomplished within a six-month
period.' Insiders caught within section 16(b)'s scope of liability include
officers, directors, and beneficial owners 5 of more than ten percent of a
corporation's securities.
Since 1934, federal courts have struggled to apply the general
terms' of section 16(b) to the complex transactions revolving around
corporate reorganizations, mergers, and other financial maneuvers involving securities. The United States Supreme Court has generally declined to get involved in this problem.7 However, in Reliance Electric
Company v. Emerson Electric Company,8 the Court examined the ap'See S. REP. No. 1455, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 55 (1934).
215

U.S.C.

§§

78a-jj (1970).

U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). In addition this section is designed "to protect the interests of
the public against the predatory operatons of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of
corporations by preventing them from speculating in the stock of the corporations to which they
owe a fiduciary duty." S. REP. No. 1455, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
115 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) as follows:
For the purpose, of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director,
or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchasedor of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. . . . The subsection
shall not be construed to cover any transactionwhere such beneficialowner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security
involved. . . . (Emphasis added.)
5
The 10% definition and filing requirements for such large stockholders are established
by § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
'Terms in § 16(b) such as "purchase," "sale," and "equity security" are defined by § 3 in
general terms also. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1 1), (13)-(14) (1970).
'Prior to 1972, the only Supreme Court § 16(b) decision was Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403
(1961). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 33 infra.
$92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).
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plication of section 16(b) to Emerson Electric Company, the corporate
owner of 13.2 percent of the stock of another corporation, which had
sold its entire holdings in two separate sales, both of which occurred
within six months of the purchase. The Court, in a four-to-three decision, held that since the first of the two sales reduced Emerson's interest
to 9.96 percent, Emerson was not liable under section 16(b) for the
profits derived from the second sale.
In Reliance, the sole issue9 was whether the second sale was within
the scope of section 16(b)'s coverage in view of Emerson's intent to
escape liability by the split sale. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Stewart, accepted the district court's finding that Emerson had split its
sale pursuant to a predetermined plan with the intent to avoid section
16(b) liability; however, the majority held that Emerson's intent to avoid
section 16(b) liability was irrelevant. In examining the objective requirements of section 16(b), the Court noted that a plan to sell that is conceived within six months of the purchase but carried out after six months
has passed clearly would not result in liability. Hence, reasoned the
majority, a plan to sell the remaining 9.96 percent did not result in
liability merely because the sale was planned with intent to avoid liability while the owner owned more than ten percent." ° The Court based its
decision on a literal interpretation of the requirement that a ten-percent
beneficial owner be such both at the time of purchase and at the time
of sale and on the congressional design of predicating liability on an
objective standard, not the investor's intent."
The dissent, written by Justice Douglas, noted that section 16(b)
liability may exist regardless of an insider's access to or intent to abuse
inside information. The dissenters advocated a policy-oriented subjective approach of interpreting the terms of section 16(b) in the manner
that-they felt-would best effectuate the purpose of the statute: They
argued that the statute should be construed as allowing a rebuttable
presumption that any such series of dispositive transactions are part of
12
a single plan of disposition and hence should be treated as one sale.
'Emerson did not appeal the court of appeals' holding that Emerson was a 10% beneficial
owner at the time of the purchase that enabled Emerson to become such. Id. at 598.
"Emerson had received written advice from its counsel that so splitting its sale could free the
second sale from § 16(b) liability. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 920-21
(6th Cir. 1970).
"92 S. Ct. at 599-600.
"Id. at 604-07. For a discussion of the subjective approach see text accompanying note 20
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The seller's actual intent, the dissent pointed out, would be irrelevant.
Instead, any factual inquiry would be limited to an objective analysis
of the circumstances surrounding the sales and to whether the tests used
in the policy-oriented subjective approach indicate that the sales fell
within the terms of the statute. The dissenters rejected the majority's
view that a ten-percent owner must literally be such both at the time of
a purchase and at the time of a sale. Instead, they felt that the purpose
of the ten-percent requirement is merely to establish the presumption
that a ten-percent owner has access to inside information. Hence, an
owner who acquires more than ten percent of a corporation's stock is
"tainted" with inside information during the entire six-month period
regardless of how he disposes of the stock.
Though there has been little litigation over the exact meaning of
the requirement that ten-percent owners be such "both at the time of
the purchase and sale," 1 3 the Reliance Court implicitly agreed with
earlier lower court rulings that "at the time of" should be construed as
"simultaneous with."" Therefore, in the Reliance situation the first and
second sales must be construed as "one sale" before section 16(b) applies. While both Justice Stewart and Justice Douglas agreed that the
finding of "one sale" may not be predicated upon the ten-percent
owner's intent, they disagreed as to what constitutes "one sale."
In answering this question, the majority in Reliance used the older
objective-literal approach: The inquiry focused principally on whether
the defendant's transactions could be characterized as a "purchase" or
"sale" under section 16(b). If so, and both the purchase and sale were
accomplished within six months, section 16(b) has been automatically
applied regardless of the actual opportunity for abuse or speculative
profit. The facts that the purchase or sale was involuntary and that the
transactions were between entities controlled by the same interests without opportunity for profit made little difference."
The Reliance majority felt that they could not adopt a subjective
approach that "flatly contradicts the words of the statute."'" Hence, the
315 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
"E.g., Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
831 (1956).
"5For a discussion of this approach see Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating
Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1968); cf Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984
(2d Cir. 1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
1192 S. Ct. at 601.
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Court declined to construe the two separate sales as one despite the fact
that an opportunity for insider profits existed in Reliance.7 The opinion

did leave open the possibility of bringing within the scope of section
16(b) such a second sale were it proven to be legally or contractually

connected to the first sale;"8 however, the majority left undecided the
standards for such "objective" proof.19

As noted above, the minority in Reliance argued in favor of adopting the policy-oriented subjective approach in determining whether the
split sale was one "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b). The initial

and critical inquiry under this approach is whether the particular transaction and circumstances surrounding it presented opportunities for the
type of abuse that section 16(b) was intended to prevent.20 The courts
that have used this approach have agreed that no one factor or particu-

lar circumstance is necessarily conclusive; rather, all the circumstances
surrounding the case must be considered. For example, in Roberts v.
Eaton,2' one of the first cases in which the subjective approach was
employed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a reclassification of stock was not a "purchase." Even though the owner had realized

a profit on a sale of the new shares within a month of the reclassification, the Roberts court found that no possibility of speculative abuse

existed since the owner's proportional interest had remained unchanged
and there had been full disclosure of the owner's intent to sell before

the shareholders had ratified the reclassification. 2
The policy-oriented subjective approach has also been used to ex-

tend section 16(b)'s scope to cover transactions not normally thought
of as purchases or sales where the court found that the transaction
"Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 924 (6th Cir. 1970). For discussion
of an opposite finding see text accompanying note 37 infra.
"See 92 S. Ct. at 600.
"For a good discussion of this point see Note, Securities Regulation-Securities Exchange
Act Section 16(b)-Owner of More than Ten Percent of issuer'sStock, Who Reduces His Holdings Below Ten Percent in One Sale With Intent to A void Liabilityfor Short-Swing Profits, Does
Not Have to DisgorgeProfits Derived FromSubsequent, "Legally" Unrelated Sales ofRemaining
Shares Within the Same Six-Month Period, 5 GA. L. REV. 584, 589-90 (1971).
"0E.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Lowenfels, supra note 15, at 50; Comment, The Application of Section 16(b) to Mergers: A Hidden
Hazard, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1417 (1969).
21212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
"The Roberts court also relied upon the facts that the new issue's value was related to the
value of the corporation, that the owner had no more knowledge than the public about how the
new issue would be accepted on the market, and that any increase in value was fortuitous. Id. at
85.
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would lend itself to speculative abuse. Thus, in Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.,23 the Second Circuit held that an exchange of stock for new
stock pursuant to a merger agreement was a "sale." The Newmark
court viewed as critical the fact that the owner of an option to purchase
shares that were later exchanged had control over the approval of a
subsequent merger agreement and stood to gain insider's profits.24
The crucial test in all such cases seems to be whether the possibility
of speculative abuse did in fact exist. In Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,2" the Second Circuit reversed a district court holding" on
the basis that the possibility of speculative abuse by a ten-percent owner
did not exist. The Abrams court re-examined the circumstances
surrounding the granting of an option and the involuntary exchange of
two
stock pursuant to a merger agreement and held that neither of these
27
16(b).
section
of
meaning
the
within
"sales"
were
transactions
The minority in Reliance insisted that there is a strong statistical
probability that any series of sales made by a ten-percent owner within
six months in which he disposes of most of his holdings is likely to be
part of a single plan of disposition.2 Since the possibility of abuse did
in fact exist, the majority and minority opinions clash over the question
of whether to rely solely on the objective definitions of the statute or
on the subjective surrounding factors.
It seems clear from the case law that the majority of courts had
adopted the policy-oriented subjective approach; 9 however, the
Reliance decision certainly has limited its application. Without overruling any previous cases, the Reliance Court has in effect proclaimed that
2425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
2
The optionee in this case exercised the option before merger plans were finalized and disclosed to he public, and the exchange occurred within six months. Id.
21450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
2
The district court had held that the granting of an option was a "sale" based on the finding
that the "insider," which had become a ten-percent owner in an unsuccessful attempt to gain
control of the issuer corporation, could use its influence and inside knowledge to oppose take-over
attempts by others or to induce the issuer or its successor to buy its stock at a profit to the insider.
323 F. Supp. 570, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
p450 F.2d at 163-65. The Abrams court distinguished Newmark on the differences in influence
and control which the ten-percent owner had over the merger. As to the option, the A brains court
viewed as critical its finding that the option was a straight-forward business agreement. Id. For a
general discussion of the problem of when stock options are purchases see Comment, 47 TEXAs L.
REV., supra note 20, at 1431-34.
2192 S. Ct. at 607.
2
'See 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3037 (Supp. 1969). See also Lowenfels, supra note
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the subjective approach is viable only "where alternative constructions
of the terms of § 16(b) are possible." 30 The Court rejected the subjective approach in Reliance because Congress had included the express
provision that a ten-percent owner must be such at both the time of the
purchase and the time of the sale.31 It has been argued that Congress
added this provision to prevent inclusion of stock owners who did not
32
in fact have the presumed access to inside corporate information.
Perhaps the subjective approach was rejected because it could lead to
harsh results: As the majority conceded, it would be difficult to rebut
the presumption that a series of dispositive transactions afforded the
owner an opportunity for speculative abuse as an insider.
Both opinions in Reliance acknowledged that Congress intended
the application of Section 16(b) to be based on objective criteria. In Blau
v. Lehman, 33 the Supreme Court also refused to use the subjective test
to extend the definition of "director" merely because of a potential for
abuse. However, in Lehman the Court's dictum left open the possibility
that subjective proof could be used to establish agency or "deputizawhen
tion" whereby a corporation itself would be deemed a "director"
34
corporation.
another
in
director
a
as
acts
one of its personnel
The Court in Reliance was concerned with the substance of the
transaction in question (the split sale) and not the intent on Emerson's
part to buy or sell within a six-month period. Using the subjective
approach, Emerson's intent to split the sale could have been viewed
merely as an evidential factor for the court to consider in determining
whether the transaction was actually one "sale" within the meaning of
section 16(b). Such a finding would then have satisfied the provision
requiring that a ten-percent beneficial owner be such "at the time of"
the sale. One who is classified as a ten-percent owner within the meaning
of section 16(b) automatically incurs liability for profits derived from a
sale within six months of a purchase regardless of his intent at the time
392 S. Ct. at 600; see text accompanying note 15 supra for a possible test of when the

of the objective approach is required.
application
31
There is very little legislative history indicating why this provision was added.
"'Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 304 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
-368 U.S. 403 (1961).
31
4 d. at 409-10. Blau was followed in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 808 (1970), in which the deputization theory was actually used to
extend § 16(b) liability on the basis of subjective factors such as "conduct" and "position" and
"control" enjoyed by the "deputy" director. See Wagner, Deputization Under Section 16(b): The
Implication of Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 78 Yale L.J. 1151, 1157-62 (1970).
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of purchase. Thus Congress intended the statute to apply mechanically."
Alternatively, the Reliance Court could have used the policyoriented subjective approach which would have permitted consideration
of the substantial effect and the circumstances surrounding the transaction in question.3 6 Such an approach would have allowed the majority
in Reliance to come to the same decision had it determined that Emerson had not in fact had an opportunity to abuse inside information.
Hence, the harsh application of section 16(b) suggested by the minority
opinion in Reliance could be avoided while the ilexibility of the subjective approach would be available for similar future cases.
The Reliance decision provides a definite loophole whereby a statu'Arguably, the intent to buy and sell within a six-month period is the only intent that is
irrelevant under § 16(b). In hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency prior
to enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran, a principal
draftsman of the Act and its chief spokesman before Congress, testified with respect to § 16(b):
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb,
because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended,
at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
A subjective standard of proof, requiring a showing of an actual unfair use of inside
information, would render senseless the provisions of the legislation limiting the liability
period to six months ....
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934); see Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Bateman,
The PragmaticInterpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for Clarification, 45 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 772, 793 (1971); Lowenfels, supra note 15, at 61.
3
After discussing the purpose of § 16(b), the Seventh Circuit in Bershad v. McDonough, 428
F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1970) stated:
The phrase "any purchase and sale" in Section 16(b) is therefore not to be limited
or defined solely in terms of commercial law of sales and notions of contractual rights
and duties (citations omitted). Applicability of this Section may depend upon the factual
circumstances of the transaction, the sequence of relevant transactions, and whether the
insider is "purchasing" or "selling" the security. . . . The insider should not be permitted to speculate with impunity merely because of the paper form of his transactions.
The court went on to note that the commercial substance of the transaction should be examined.
Id.
"See Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971). It should be noted
that the Reliance Court might have found the split sale not a sale within the meaning of § 16(b)
on the basis of the involuntary nature of the sale. See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). Arguably the sale in Reliance was involuntary

because many mergers are completed within six months, R.

MUNDHEIM,

A.

FLEISCHER,

& D.

GLAZER, FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 283 (1970), and the completion
of the merger may very likely also be a sale. Id. at 286; e.g., Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425
F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
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tory insider may now dispose of his last 9.9 percent in a legally separate
sale within six months of the purchase and retain any profits realized.
Hence, the profit motive has been at least partially returned to a beneficial owner who wishes to engage in short-term speculation with the aid
of inside information. However, this loophole may be somewhat illusory. Ten-percent beneficial owners are fiduciaries in the same sense as
are directors and officers, 3 and section 16(b) was enacted to prevent
the abuse of this relationship. But recent judicial development in federal
and state law has caused the demise of section 16(b) as the sole remedy
for such abuse. The federal courts have begun to develop another remedy by extending the definition of common law fraud under rule lOb539 to include the failure to disclose material information by either a
purchaser or a seller in a transaction. A cause of action under rule lOb5 thus may become the principal means of barring speculative abuse of
confidential corporate information by insiders since rule lOb-5 has none
of the restrictions that circumscribe the application of section 16(b).4 °
In Diamond v. Oreamuno,41 the Court of Appeals of New York
held that although section 16(b) might not apply, a stockholder's derivative action could be maintained under state law to deal with the abuse
of a fiduciary relationship by an insider who had actually used corporate
information for his own benefit, even though the corporation had not
been injured. The primary concern of the court in this case was who had
the more legitimate claim to the proceeds derived from the exploitation
of inside information.
In conclusion, it seems that the Court's decision has unnecessarily
restricted the Court's flexibility to employ the subjective approach, and
thereby the policy underlying section 16(b) has been thwarted. Perhaps
this decision, in light of newer developing remedies, is a harbinger of a
new reluctance to apply the subjective approach to expand the scope of
section 16(b) liability beyond its literal meaning.
THOMAS J. MATKOV

38See Fratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
" SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
4
Bateman, supra note 35 at 785; Lowenfels, supra note 15, at 61-64; see SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
4124 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).

